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TITLE 14

CONTRACTORS'
BONDS
Chapter 1. Public Contracts, 14-1-1 to 14-1-4.
2. Private Contracts, 14-2-1, 14-2-2.

CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Section

14-1-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen_
14-1-1.1. Security in connection with bids for doing work or furnishing materials and supplies-Forfeiture.
14-1-2. Action on bond-Parties-Intervention-Interpleader-Limitation
of
action.
14-1-3. Failure to require bond-Direct
liability-Limitation
of action.
14-1-4. Attorneys' fees allowed.

14-1-1. Bond to protect mechanics, and materialmen.-Every person entering into a contract for the construction or alteration of, or addition to,
any public work, building, structure or improvement shall, before the
work under any such contract is commenced, be required to furnish a good
and sufficient bond for the faithful performance of such contract, and
further conditioned that the contractor will promptly make payment to all
persons supplying labor or materials used in the prosecution of the work.
When such contract is made with the state, or with a state institution,
board or commission which is not a body politic or corporate, the state shall
be named as the obligee in such bond, and when made with a county,
municipal corporation, board of education or other body politic, the same,
as the case may be, shall be named as the obligee.
History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 1; 1917, ch.
36, § 2; C. L. 1917, § 3753; R. S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 17-1-1.

Compiler's Note.
This statute originated as Laws 1905, ch.
87, and was § 1400x of the Compiled Laws
of 1907 (now repealed).
Cross-References.
Cities and towns,
Counties, general
tracts, 17-4-3.
State institutions,
64-1-4.

contracts by, 10-7-20.
power to make concontracts

by, 64-1-3,

Purpose and construction.
This statute is highly remedial for the
benefit of and to provide security for all
persons who furnish labor and materials
on public work.
Campbell Bldg. Co. v.
District Court of Millard County, 90 U.
552, 556, 63 P. 2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250.
This statute is not for the benefit of
the contractor
but is for the benefit of
the state, the creditors and the surety.
State for Use and Benefit of McBride v.
Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d
341.
3.

Origin of statute.
Utah statute is similar to that of the
United States on the same subject, and
was undoubtedly taken from the federal
act. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. District Court
of Millard County, 90 U. 552, 557, 63 P.
2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250.
1.

2.

Necessity for furnishing bond.
Under this section anyone interested
may demand that a bond be executed or
1·equired, and thereafter
a refusal to do
so would be willful. Joseph Nelson Supply
Co. v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047.
Company contracting with executive department
of city for erection and con-
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struction of electric power plant and distribution
syst0m, in accordance with initiated ordinance,
must furnish bond for
performance
and completion
of contract
and prompt payment of all persons supplying labor or materials used in prosecution
of the work. Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Provo City, 94 U. 203, 74 P. 2d 1191.
(Moffat, J., and Folland, C. J., dissenting.)

Obligee, necessity of naming in bond.
The second sentence of this section was
no doubt intended to provide a means for
any state institution
to receive the benetit
of a surety bond when it has not the legal
capacity
to do so on its own behalf.
Moreover, the Utah state building commjssion is a "body politic and corporate"
in contemplation
of law;
accordingly,
surety bond was not void because of its
failure to name the state of Utah as the
obligee. Moreover, bonding company may
be estopped to deny liability. Utah State
Bldg. Comm. for Use and Benefit of Mountain States Supply Co. v. Great American
Indemnity
Co., 105 U. 11, 140 P. 2d 763,
considering
at some length the general
question as to who is a body politic and
corporate.
4.

5.

Liability for failure to exact bond.
Under a former section it was held that
the failure of a school district to require
such a bond from a contractor
did not
render it liable to one to whom the contractor assigned moneys due under the contract and whose right to such moneys was
made subordinate
to claims for labor and
materials,
for the reason that bond was
not intended for its benefit.
The words
"shall be required" are no stronger than if
the phrase "is hereby required" had been
used. South High School Dist. v. McMillan Paper & Supply Co., 49 U. 477, 164 P.
1041; Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary,
49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047, applying
Laws
1909, ch. 68.
This section merely requires contractor
to execute the bond mentioned
therein,
but does not impose the duty upon any
particular
person to exact such a bond.
New York Blower Co. v. Carbon County
High School, 50 U. 342, 167 P. 670.
Under this section a school district is
not liable to parties, supplying labor and
material to construct high school building,
for failure to require the bond mentioned
herein.
New York Blower Co. v. Carbon
County High School, 50 U. 342, 167 P.
670, following Joseph Nelson Supply Co.
v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047.

Liability on bond.
Under this section, the school trustees
are not personally
liable for failure to
require the bond mentioned herein.
New
6.

York Blower Co. v. Carbon County
School, 50 U. 342, 167 P. 670.

High

Remedies.
Formerly
a person who furnished
materials to con tractor for construction
of a
high school building
had an adequate
remedy by bringing an action against the
high school before money arising out of
contract was paid either to contractor or
on his 01·der. New York Blower Co. v.
Carbon County High School, 50 U. 342,
167 P. 670, applying
Comp. Laws 1907,
§ 1400x, now repealed.
7.

Collateral References.
Statese=:>101.
81 C.J.S. States § 119.
Bond of contractor,
43 Am. Jur. 879,
Public Works and Contracts § 137 et seq.
Acceptance of construction
work as releasing contractors
or sureties on bond
conditioned
for performance
of construction contract
or guaranteeing
completed
work, 109 A. L. R. 625.
Claim under subcontract
by which subcontractor
agrees to furnish a man and
truck, or other specified instrumentality,
at an unapportioned
compensation,
as
within contractor's
bond conditioned
for
payment of claims for labor, 79 A. L. R.
1253.
Clothing, food, or lodging for laborers
as covered by contractor's
bond, 46 A. L.
R. 511, 65 A. L. R. 260.
Concrete forms, material or labor employed in construction
of, as basis of mechanic's lien or claim under contractor's
bond, 84 A. L. R. 460.
Fuel furnished
contractor
or subcontractor as within coverage of bond to pay
for materials furnished, 96 A. L. R. 553.
Gasoline and oil as within contractor's
bond, 91 A. L. R. 1027.
Injuries to persons or property, claims
for, against contractor's
bond, 67 A. L. R.
990.
Insurance
premiums other than workmen's compensation insm·ance, contractor's
bond as covering, 129 A. L. R. 1087.
Labor and materials
furnished to subcontractor:
-as
within coverage of principal coutracto1·'s bond for public improvement, 70
A. L. R. 308, 111 A. L. R. 311.
-existence
and extent of lien or claim
for, against money due principal contractor
for public improvement,
112 A. L. R. 815.
-liability
of surety on subcontractor's
bond to principal contractor for public improvement or to his surety, in respect of
claims for, 117 A. L. R. 662.
Loss of profit of subcontractor,
laborer
or materialman
as within coverage of contractor's bond, 119 A. L. R. 1281.
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Medical or hospital
services to employees, claim for, as within coverage of
contractor's bond, 81 A. L. R. 1051.
Money loaned or advanced to contractor
as within coverage of bond of building
or construction
contractor,
127 A. L. R.
974, 164 A. L. R. 782.
Noncompliance
with statutory
requirement as to approval of bond, right of
sureties to take advantage of, 77 A. L. R.
1479.
One who contracts
with, or furnishes
labor or material
to, public contractor's
surety after latter has taken over work,
right in respect of pa1-t of contract price
retained by public agency, 122 A. L. R.
511.
Paving contract or contractor's
bond in
respect of the contractor's
obligation
as
to repairs, construction of, 72 A. L. R. 644.
Payments or advancements
to building
contrnctor by obligee as affecting rights as
between obligee and surety on contractor's
bond, 127 A. L. R. 10.
"Public work," what constitutes within
statute relating to contractor's
bond, 101
A. L. R. 565.

14-1-2

Rental of equipment as within contractor's bond, 44 A. L. R. 381.
Repairs or replacements
of machinery,
tools, and equipment as within contractor's
bond, 67 A. L. R. 1232.
Statutory conditions, effect of, provision
in public contractor's
bond excluding, 77
A. L. R. 166, 118 A. L. R. 57.
Statutory conditions prescribed for public contractor's bond as part of bond which
does not in terms include them, 89 A. L.
R. 446.
Surety on contractor's
bond, and assignee of money to become due on contract, right as between, 76 A. L. R. 917.
Surety who completes contract, right to
moneys earned by contractor but unpaid
before default, 45 A. L. R. 379, 134 A. L.
R. 738, 164 A. L. R. 613.
Validity of condition in bond of contractor for public work, beyond requirements of statute or ordinance, with respect to claims of third person, 18 A. L. R.
1227.
Workmen's compensation insurance premiums as within coverage of contractor's
bond, 102 A. L. R. 135, 164 A. L. R. 1468.

14-1-1.1. Security in connection with bids for doing work or furnishing
mate-rials and supplies-Forfeiture.-Any
person, firm, partnership,
corporation, or association bidding to do work or furnish materials and supplies for the state, or for any political subdivision thereof, may, if the
regulations of an institution, board, commission, or department
of the
state or the regulations of any political subdivision so authorize, be required to furnish and file security with said bid in the form of cash, certified check, or cashier's check or a surety bond in an amount specified in
the notice of the advertisement calling for such bid; provided that such
security shall not exceed five per cent of the amount bid. The state, or
any political subdivision thereof, upon refusal by the contractor to enter
into a contract and to furnish a payment and performance bond after
having been notified that said contractor is the lowest responsible bidder
will then require said contractor to forfeit to the state or its political subdivision the amount of the security as liquidated damages for the contractor's failure to produce a performance or payment bond and to enter
into the contract as anticipated by the advertisement for bid.
History:
C. 1953, 14-1-1.1, enacted
L. 1953, ch. 23, § 1.

by

Title of Act.
An act enacting a new section to be
known as section 14-1-1.1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, authorizing
the state of
Utah and its political
subdivisions
to
require that security be furnished
and
filed in connection with bids for doing

work or furnishing materials and supplies;
and providing for the forfeiture
of such
security under cei·tain conditions.
Collateral References.
States(s:;:;>101.
Claims within protection
of obligation
for payment of laborers, 43 Am. Jur. 921
et seq., Public Works and Contracts § 181
et seq.

14-1-2. Action on bond-Parties-Intervention-Inte,rpleader-Limitation of action.-Any
person who has furnished labor or materials for the
construction or alteration of, or addition to, any public building, work,
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structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, may
intervene in any action commenced by the obligee or other person on
the bond of the contractor and have his claim adjudicated therein, subject
to the priority of the claim of the obligee. If the full amount of such bond
is insufficient to satisfy all claims, then, after payment of the amount due
the obligee, the remainder shall be distributed pro rata among the parties
establishing claims. If no action is brought by the obligee within six
months from the completion and final settlement, or abandonment, of the
contract, then any person who has supplied labor or materials shall, upon
application therefor, be furnished with a certified copy of the original
contract and bond, upon which he shall have a right of action, and may sue
the contractor and his surety, for his own benefit, in the name of the
obligee, in any court having jurisdiction in the county where the contract
was to be performed, and may prosecute such action to final judgment and
execution; provided, that where such action is instituted by any such creditor it shall not be commenced until after the complete performance of such
contract and final settlement thereof, or abandonment thereof, and shall
be commenced within one year thereafter and not later; provided further,
that only one action shall be brought upon such bond, and any creditor may
be made, or may become, a party thereto. If the recovery upon such bond
shall be inadequate to pay the amounts found due all of such creditors, distribution shall be made among them pro rata. In all actions instituted
under the provisions of this chapter notice of the pendency thereof, informing them of their right to intervene, shall be served upon all known
creditors personally, and in addition thereto service of the notice shall
be made by publication, in the same manner as is required for service
of summons; such service to be complete at least two months before the
expiration of the time limited for intervention by creditors. .All claimants
and creditors who do not intervene, or assert and establish their claims,
in such action shall be forever barred from recovery upon such bond.
The surety upon such bond may pay into court, for distribution among
the creditors, the amount of the penalty named in the bond, less any amount
paid to the obligee by reason of the execution thereof, and upon so doing
shall be relieved of any further liability.
History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 1; 1917, ch.
36, ~ 2; C. L. 1917, § 3753; R. S. 1933 & C.
1943, 17-1-2.
Compiler's Note.
This statute originated
as Laws 1905,
ch. 87, and was § 1400x of the Compiled
Laws of 1907 (now repealed).
Purpose and construction
of act.
This section, in so far as it allows "any
person" supplying labor or materials
to
sue, is highly remedial, and must, in furtherance of justice, receive a liberal construction and application so as to accomplish its real object· and purpose.
Mellen
v. Vondor-Horst
Bros., 44 U. 300, 140 P.
130, applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 1400x,
now repealed.
1.

It would seem that the rights of "any
person" furnishing labor or mate1·ials under this seetion must he determined upon
equitable principles rather than upon strict
legal rules. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros.,
44 U. 300, 140 P. 130, applying Comp.
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now rnpealed, but
which formerly was contained in the Lien
Act.
The purpose of the fo1·mer statute was
to enable creditors of or claimants against
contractor
on public buildings to collect
for work and materials furnished by them
ratably and equitably from contractor and
his bondsmen in all cases to full amount
and extent of surety bond. Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West, 55 U.
357, 186 P. 114.
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2, Lien of laborers or materialmen.
Although
a workman
or materialman
cannot acquire a lien on a public building
for labor or material furnished in the construction
of such building
in view of
38-1-1, he may have a preferential
right to
moneys in the hands of the public corporation to be used in the construction
of the
building
under this section.
Mountain
States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-Allen
Co., 63
U. 384, 225 P. 811.
3. Performance of contract.
Where the contract
between the contractor and a materialman
is silent as to
when contractor
should pay for the materials furnished
for the construction
of
public building, payment is due on delivery, and interest is properly allowed accordingly.
Board of Education of Granite
School Dist. v. Southern
Surety Co., 76
U. 63, 73, 287 P. 332.
4. Abandonment of contract.
A contract cannot be regarded as having been abandoned
within meaning of
this section if its terms and conditions
were performed
by surety company instead of by the contractor.
Mellen v.
Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 U. 300, 140 P. 130.
5. Right of action.
It is reasonable to assume that the right
of the claimant against the fund under
this section does not depend upon whether
the contractor
makes any profit on the
building or not.
The action is one by
which a fund is to be reached rather than
one in which a personal judgment is intended to be obtained
against
anyone.
Mellen v. Vondor-Horst
Bros., 44 U. 300,
140 P. 130, applying
Comp. Laws 1907,
§ 1400x, now repealed.
Original contractor engaged by board of
education to do reconstruction
work on
school building, held entitled to recover
from subcontractor,
who used inferior materials in painting school, as against contention that school board would not hold
its contractor to strict accountability
for
not complying with specifications furnished
him. Board of Education
of Salt Lake
City v. West, 55 U. 357, 186 P. 114.
6. Limitations as to time.
Under this section, surety company may
extend time within which an action may
be begun on its undertaking,
and having
done so, it cannot be heard to shift its
position to escape liability
which it assumed. Board of Education
of Granite
School Dist. v. Southern Surety Co., 76
U. 63, 71, 287 P. 332.
The purpose of this statute is to give
the state an opportunity
to proceed first
against the bond, and for that purpose it
has six months' time within which to bring

14-1-2

its action after completion of the work
and final settlement
as administratively
determined
by the proper officer. After
that and within the year other claimants
may bring suit. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. District Court of Millard County, 90 U. 552,
559, 63 P. 2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250.
When the state has determined
in its
regular administrative
order what the contractor owes it, that is, what claims it
may have against
the surety, it must
promptly
assert same so as not to unreasonably
delay other creditors.
State
for Use and Benefit of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341.
- computation of time.
Under this section the special statute of
limitations
does not begin to run until
the building is completed and there is a
final settlement
of the amount due under
the contract. An erroneous final certificate
given by the architect,
which was later
changed because of the error and a correct
one given. cannot be said to constitute
a
"final settlement."
Board of Education of
Granite School Dist. v. Southern Surety
Co., 76 U. 63, 69, 287 P. 332.
The "final settlement" referred to in this
section is the point from which time is
computed so that after six months and
within a year such claimants as have not
been paid may bring an action to recover
on the bond. The date of "final settlement" is not and cannot be delayed by
mere failure to accept the amount fixed by
the architect or engineer in his final estimate. Final settlement
is quite different
from final payment.
Campbell Bldg. Co.
v. District Court of Millard County, 90 U.
552, 557, 63 P. 2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250.
Final settlement within this section does
not mean final payment or final disposition
of all matters under the contract but that
the state has administratively
determined
that performance
under the contract has
been made by the contractor and has determined whether or not it has any claims
to assert against the surety because of the
contractor's
failure to perform according
to the contract.
State for Use and Benefit
of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U.
326, 77 P. 2d 341.
In suit by a materialman
on a public
works contractor's
bond, record justified
finding that there was a final settlement
under this statute
six months prior to
commencement
of the action.
State for
Use and Benefit of McBride v. Campbell
Bldg. Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341.
Six months' period of priority of right
of state to sue, as against other creditors,
begins to run when state has determined
amount it considers it owes contractor,
from which it has deducted any sum contractor owes it. State for Use and Bene-
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U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341.
8.

CONTRACTORS'
Bldg. Co., 94

-

claims of creditors
against
contractor.
This statute
deals only with actions
against the surety, and claims of creditors
against the contractor
are not affected
thereby, and such claims may be asserted
at any time within the general statute of
limitations.
State for Use and Benefit of
McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U.
326, 77 P. 2d 341.
Final settlement under this statute could
not be affected by the fact that the contractor might not agree with the determination made by the state. State for Use
and Benefit of McBride v. Campbell Bldg.
Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341.
Summons and process.
Under a somewhat similar provision it
was held that ·the surety company became
the alter ego of the contractor, and it was
even held that personal service upon such
contractor was not necessary.
Mellen v.
Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 U. 300, 140 P. 130,
applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 1400x, now
repealed.
9.

10. Notice of pendency.
. The giving of the ~rescri~ed_ n?ti~e of
pendency to claimants is not Jurisdiction~l,
and a surety, when sued, may not com~lam
that the notice given was not sufficient,
since no prejudice can result to the surety.
Board of Education
of Granite School
Dist. v. Southern Surety Co., 76 U. 63, 67,
287 P. 332.
11. Joinder of parties.
Under a former statute, one furnishing
materials to or doing work for a principi_i,l
contractor
in the construction
or repair
of any public work for citie~, t~wns, villages, counties, or school districts,
was
permitted to sue both the contra~tor _and
the city, which gave _a preferential
right
to laborers and matenalmen
even over an
assignee of the contract price, a contr_actor's trustee in bankruptcy.
South High
School Dist. v. McMillan Paper & Supply
Co., 49 U. 477, 164 P. 1041, applying Comp.
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed; Joseph
Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 U. 493,
164 P. 1047; George A. Lowe & Co. v.
Leary, 49 U. 506, 164 P. 1052.
12. Jury trial.
Action by board of education for use
and benefit of subcontractor
against original contractor and his surety was one at
law entitling
party to jury trial when
seasonably demanded in accordance with
Code 1943, 104-23-6. Board of Education
of Salt Lake City v. West, 55 U. 357, 186
P. 114. For present law as to demand of

BONDS

jury trial, see Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 38(b).
In action by board of education for use
and benefit of subcontractor
against original contractor and his surety, in which
materialman
filed his complaint in intervention,
held that materialman
having
failed to demand jury to try issues within
time allowed under statute, it must therefore be held that his legal right to jury
trial was waived.
Board of Education of
Salt Lake City v. West, 55 U. 357, 186
P. 114.
13. Liability of sureties.
Under former statute, in suit involving
the right to unpaid contract price as between materialman and surety on bond of
contractor constructing public school building, wherein materialman
did not proceed
against bond, but sued contractor and attempted to reach balance due on contract
by garnishment, and surety, who had paid
out considerable sums on account of its
liability, and to whom contract price had
been assigned by contractor, asserted its
superior right to fund, it was held that
the amended statute (Laws 1917, ch. 36)
had so changed remedy of materialman as
to render his claim no obstacle in way of
assignment
of contract price to surety,
and that surety was not liable for assigned
fund since a substantial remedy was provided in amended statute for enforcement
of any rights which subcontractor
had
under provision of statute repealed.
Salt
Lake Electric Supply Co. v. West, 54 U.
564, 182 P. 215.
In a subsequent
decision, Salt Lake
City v. O'Connor, 68 U. 233, 249 P. 810,
49 A. L. R. 941, the court in commenting
on the West case, cited above, stated that
while the right of the contractor to assign
the contract price to the surety in that
particular case, notwithstanding
the claim
of the materialman
who by statute had
substantial
but different
remedy, was
affirmed, whether surety had such an equitJ
in contract price as would prohibit an
assignment thereof to its prejudice by contractor was not considered or decided, and
case was no authority on that question.
14. Subrogation of sureties.
Surety on bond of contractor absconding
upon completion of work, leaving unpaid
materialmen, is entitled to unpaid portion
of contract price remaining in hands of
city, as against bank which, during progress of work, loaned contractor
money
upon his assignment of all sums due or to
become due under the contract.
Salt Lake
City v. O'Connor, 68 U. 233, 244, 249 P.
810, 49 A. L. R. 941.
Surety on contractor's bond not entitled
to be credited with payments which city

362

PUBLIC

CONTRACTS

made to contractor and he then paid materialmen, where latter credited amounts
received on past indebtedness
of contractor incurred on previous jobs covered by
other sureties, materialmen being unaware
that sums received were paid by city
under particular
contract. Salt Lake City
v. O'Connor, 68 U. 233, 244, 249 P. 810, 49
A. L. R. 941.

14-1-4

performance of the public contract. Board
of Education of Granite School Dist. v.
Southern Surety Co., 76 U. 63, 72, 287 P.
332; and see Salt Lake City v. O'Connor,
68 U. 233, 237, 249 P. 810, 49 A. L. R. 941.

15. Priorities-Single
action preferable.
There is probably no priority between
or among those who present their claims
under this section. The rights of all are
equal. All may intervene in one action
or may bring separate actions. It would
be preferable, however, in order to conserve the fund, that all should intervene
in one action. Joseph Nelson Supply Co.
v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047; George
A. Lowe & Co. v. Leary, 49 U. 506, 164
P. 1052.

16, Application of payments.
In the absence of instruction as to application of payments, a creditor of the
contractor may apply moneys received by
the latter from a public contract in payment of any item, and the surety cannot
complain that such payments were not applied on obligations growing out of the

Collateral References.
Statese=:>101.
81 C.J.S. States § 125.
Bond of contractor,
43 Am. Jur. 879,
Public Works and Contracts § 137 et seq.
Construction
and application
of provisions of statute
or public contractor's
bond as to time when action may be
brought thereon by laborers or materialmen, 119 A. L. R. 255.
Nature of remedy to enforce obligation
under bond of public contractor for labor
or material, 43 A. L. R. 561.
Provision
in public contractor's
bond
purporting
to limit right of action to
obligee as affecting laborers or materialmen, 77 A. L. R. 125, 126, 118 A. L. R. 57.
Right of person furnishing material or
labor to maintain action on contractor's
bond to owner or public body, or on owner's bond to mortgagee, 77 A. L. R. 21,
118 A. L. R. 57.

14-1-3. Failure to require bond-Direct liability-Limitation of action.
-Any county, municipal corporation, board of education, state institution, board or association which shall fail or neglect to obtain the delivery
of a bond as herein required shall, upon demand, itself promptly make payment to all persons who have supplied materials or performed labor in
the prosecution of the work under the contract, and any such creditor
shall have a direct right of action upon his account against any such county,
municipal corporation, school district, board of education, institution,
board or association in any court having jurisdiction in the county in
which the contract was to be performed and executed; which action must
be commenced within one year after the complete performance and final
settlement, or abandonment, of the contract.
History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 1; 1917, ch.
36, § 3; C. L. 1917, § 3754; R. S. 1933 & C.
1943, 17-1-3.

Collateral References.
Statese=:>101.
81 C.J.S. States § 117.
Failure of public authorities
to take
contractor's bond as required by law as

rendering them liable to laborers or materialmen, 64 A. L. R. 678.
Liability of subcontractor upon bond or
other agreement indemnifying general contractor against liability for damage to person or property, 143 A. L. R. 312.
Personal liability
of public officer or
sureties on his bond for nonperformance
or improper performance
of a duty imposed upon a board or corporate body of
which he is a member, 123. A. L. R. 756.

14-1-4. Attorneys' fees allowed.-In any action brought upon bond provided for herein the prevailing party, upon each separate cause of action,
shall recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as costs.
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History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 2; 1917, ch.
36, §4; C. L.1917, §3755; R. S.1933 &
C. 1943, 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, § 1.

ceeding the sum of $50," following
ney's fee."

Compiler's Note.
The 1961 amendment

Collateral References.
StatesPl0l.
81 C.J.S. States § 125.

deleted

", not ex-

"attor-

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section

14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct
liability.

14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialm.en.-The owner of any
interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for
the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced,
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price,
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance
of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to
all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has
furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building,
structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall
have a direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed upon; which right of
action shall accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or
default in the performance, of the work provided for in the contract.
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1-3; C. L.
1917, §§ 3759-3761; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-2-1.

Validity and effect.
This section is constitutional;
it does
not infringe the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Darke, 50 U. 114, 167 P. 241, L. R. A.
1918A, 1193.
For obvious reasons there is nothing
unreasonable,
harsh or oppressive about
this legislation.
Rio Grande Lumber Co.
v. Darke, 50 U. 114, 122, 167 P. 241, L. R.
A. 1918A, 1193.
This statute
is auxiliary
to our Mechanics/ Lien Law, and is just as much
in aid of it as if it had been made a part
of it and incorporated in the same chapter. California did incorporate a somewhat
similar section in its Mechanics' Lien Law.
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 U.
114, 124, 167 P. 241, L. R. A. 1918A, 1193.
1.

2.

Purpose of chapter.
The purpose of this statute is to prevent owners of land from having their
lands improved with materials and labor
furnished
and performed
by third persons, and thus to enhance the value of
such lands, without becoming personally
responsible for reasonable, value of materials and labor. Libe·rty Coal & Lumber
Co. v. Snow, 53 U. 298, 178 P. 341.
The bond provided for in this chapter
appears to be for the purpose of protecting the materialmen and those furnishing
labor against
nonpayment
of their accounts by the contractor. Bamberger Co. v.
Certified Productions, Inc., 88 U. 194, 211,
48 P. 2d 489.
3. Duty to furnish bond.
Under this section a bond may be demanded from the contractor to the lessee
to protect lessee and lessor against mechanics' liens. Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 U. 213, 53 P. 2d 1153.
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4. Sufficiency of bond.
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon
contractor's
faithful performance
of contract, and containing no express provision
for payment of materialmen, was sufficient
under this section to exonerate owner from
liability, and to sustain right of materialmen to sue surety, in view of the fact that
contract expressly required contractor to
pay for all labor and materials. De Luxe
Class Co. v. Martin, 116 U. 144, 208 P. 2d
1127.
Leveling of land.
Work done upon land in leveling the
same is not an improvement
upon land
requiring the owner to obtain a bond from
the contractor.
Backus v. Hooten, 4 U.
(2d) 364, 294 P. 2d 703, 704.
Conceding that leveling land enhances
its value and improves its utility it does
not follow that such leveling constituted
an improvement
upon land within this
statute.
Likewise, it would seem to be
an unreasonable construction to hold that
a contract for plowing, seeding, or manuring of land is a contract for the construction of an improvement upon land. Backus
v. Hooten, 4 U. (2d) 364, 294 P. 2d 703
704.
'
5.

6. Proof of status as materialman.
Invoice between plaintiff and installer
reciting that merchandise was purchased
for resale, was not conclusive evidence
that plaintiff was a materialman
entitled
to the benefits of this statute. Crane Co.
v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 U. (2d) 413
335 P. 2d 837.
'
7. Terms of bond.
Where the condition of the bond is
that the surety will indemnify the owner
if the contractor fails to pay for material
and labor, it is not such a bond contemplated by this section so as to allow a
direct action by the materialman
against
the surety, as it does not promise that
the contractor will pay for the material
and labor.
Boise-Payette
Lbr. Co. v.
Phoenix Indemnity Co., 3 U. (2d) 150, 280
P. 2d 448. (Dissenting opinion 3 U. (2d)
150, 280 P. 2d 448, 451.)
8. Unlicensed subcontractor.
The fact that a subcontractor
is unlicensed under section 58-6-1 (since repealed) will not bar his right to sue on
a bond or directly against the owner who
fails to require a bond. Whipple v. Fuller,
5 U. (2d) 211, 299 P. 2d 83,7, 838.
Collateral References.
Mechanics' Liense::>313,.
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.
Bonds and insurance, 9 Am. Jur.

56,

Building
et seq.

and Construction

14-2-1
Contracts

§ 86

Acceptance of construction work as releasing contractors
or sureties on bond
conditioned for performance
of construction contract or guaranteeing
completed
work, 109 A. L. R. 625.
Clothing, food, or lodging for laborers,
contractor's bond as covering, 46 A. L. R.
511, 65 A. L. R. 260.
Concrete forms, material or labor employed in construction
of, as basis of
mechanics' lien or claim under contractors'
bond, 84 A. L. R. 460.
Freight charges on material as within
contractor's bond securing such claims, 30
A. L. R. 466.
Fuel furnished contractor or subcontractor as within coverage of bond to pay
for materials furnished, 96 A. L. R. 553.
Gasoline and oil as within contractor's
bond, 91 A. L. R. 1027.
Injuries to persons or property, claims
for against contractor's bond, 67 A. L. R.
990.
Insurance
premiums other than workmen's compensation insurance, contractor's
bond as covering, 129 A. L. R. 1087.
Loss of profit of subcontractor,
laborer,
or materialman as within coverage of contractor's bond, 119 A. L. R. 1281.
Medical or hospital
services to employees, claim for, as within coverage of
contractor's
bond, 81 A. L. R. 1051.
Money loaned or advanced to contractor
as within coverage of bond of building or
construction contractor, 127 A. L. R. 974,
164 A. L. R. 782.
Noncompliance
with statutory
requirement as to approval of bond, right of
sureties to take advantage of, 77 A. L. R.
1479.
Paving contract or contractor's bond in
respect of the contractor's obligation as to
repairs, construction of, 72 A. L. R. 644.
Payments or advancements
to building
contractor by obligee as affecting rights
as between obligee and surety on contractor's bond, 127 A. L. R. 10.
Person furnishing
material
or labor,
right to maintain action on contractor's
bond to owner or public body, or on owner's bond to mortgagee, 118 A. L. R. 57.
Rental of equipment as within contractor's bond, 44 A. L. R. 381.
Repairs or replacements
of machinery,
tools, and equipment as within contractor's bond, claims for, 67 A. L. R. 1232.
Subcontract
by which subcontractor
agrees to furnish a man and truck
or
other specified instrumentality,
at an' unapportioned compensation, claim under as
within contractor's
bond conditioned 'for
payment of claims for labor, 79 A. L. R.
1253.

365

14-2-2

CONTRACTORS'

Surety on contractor's
bond, and assignee of money to become due on contract, right as between, 76 A. L. R. 917.
Surety who completes contract, right to
moneys earned by contractor but unpaid

BONDS

before default, 45 A. L. R. 379, 134 A. L.
R. 738, 164 A. L. R. 613.
Workmen's compensation insurance premiums as within coverage of contractor's
bond, 102 A. L. R. 135, 164 A. L. R. 1468.

14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct liability.-Any person subject
to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed
labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices
agreed upon.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 4, 5; C. L.
1917, §§ 3762, 3763; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-2-2.
1.

In general.
Cited or applied in Boise-Payette
Lbr.
Co. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 3 U. (2d)
150, 280 P. 2d 448, 449; Backus v. Hooten,
4 U. (2d) 364, 294 P. 2d 703, 704.
2.

Validity.
This
section
is constitutional.
Rio
Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 U. 114,
167 P. 241, L. R. A. 1918A, 1193.
3.

Duty to exact bond.
Where agreement
between
son who
owned real property and his father required latter to construct dwelling upon
land of son, and provided that father
would pay cost and expenses of constructing house, it was held that it was
duty of son to require his father to execute bond provided for by this section for
protection
of those who furnished
materials for and performed labor on house,
but in absence of securing such bond, he
was liable for value of materials. Liberty

Coal & Lumber
178 P. 341.

Co. v. Snow, 53 U. 298,

4.

Sufficiency of bond.
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon
contractor's
faithful performance
of contract, and containing no express provision
for payment of materialmen, was sufficient
under this section to exonerate owner from
liability, and to sustain right of materialmen to sue surety, in view of the fact that
contract expressly required contractor to
pay for all labor and materials. De Luxe
Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 U. 144, 208 P. 2d
1127.

5. Unlicensed subcontractor.
Fact that a subcontractor
is unlicensed
will not bar his right to sue on a bond
or directly against the owner who fails to
require a bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 U.
(2d) 211, 299 P. 2d 837, 838.
Collateral References.
Mechanics' LiensP313.
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.
Bonds and insurance,
9 Am Jur. 56,
Building and Construction Contracts § 86
et seq.
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TITLE 15

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
Chapter 1. Interest, 15-1-1 to 15-1-5, 15-1-7, 15-1-10 [15-1-6, 15-1-8, 15-1-9
Repealed].
2. Legal Capacity of Children, 15-2-1 to 15-2-4.
3. Interparty Agreements, 15-3-1 to 15-3-4.
4. Joint Obligations, 15-4-1 to 15-4-7.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section

15-1-1.
15-1-2.
15-1-2a.
15-1-3.
15-1-4.
15-1-5.
15-1-6.
15-1-7.
15-1-8.
15-1-9.
15-1-10.

Legal rate.
Maximum rates.
Conditional
sales of tangible personal property-Regulation
tracts-Maximum
rates,
Calculated by the year.
Interest
on judgments.
Usury-Taking
excessive interest a misdemeanor.
Repealed.
Usury-Forfeiture
of all interest-Triple
damages for interest
paid-Limitation
of action.
Repealed.
Repealed,
Usury-Discounting
negotiable
paper.

of con-

already

15-1-1. Legal rate.-The
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action shall be six per cent per
annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way
affect any penalty or interest charge which by law applies to delinquent
or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before the 14th day
of May, 1907.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C. L. 1907,
§ 1241; C. L. 1917, § 3320; R. S. 1933, 440-1; L. 1935, ch. 42,, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1935 amendment
reduced the rate
from eight per cent to six per cent, inserted "any penalty
or interest
charge
which by law applies to delinquent
or
other taxes or to," and substituted
"obligations" for "obligation."
Prior to February 14, 1868, there was no
territorial statute on the subject of interest in Utah. Godbe v. Young, 1 U. 55, 58,
reversed on another point in 15 Wall. (82
U. S.) 562, 21 L. Ed. 250. At that time it
was enacted, "That it shall not be lawful
to take more than 10 per cent interest per
annum, when the amount of interest has
not been specified or agreed upon." (Laws

1868, ch. 13, p. 15.) But on February
19,
1869, this act was repealed and the following enacted, to wit: "That it shall be lawful to take ten per cent interest per annum, when the amount of interest has not
been specified or agreed upon." (Laws
1869, ch. 19, p. 17.) Perry v. Taylor, 1 U.
63, 65. The Act of 1869 became Comp.
Laws 1876, § 380, and its provisions
remained unchanged.
(Godbe v. Young, 1
U. 55, reversed on another point in 15
Wall. (82 U. S.) 562, 21 L. Ed. 250) until
it was repealed because of its negative
character. Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 63.
Thus it will be seen that former rate
was ten per cent per annum. Openshaw v.
Utah & N. Ry. Co., 6 U. 268, 21 P. 999.
Subsequently the legal rate was changed
to eight per cent in the absence of agreement, R. S. 1898, § 1241. This section was
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repealed by Laws 1907, ch. 46, § 14, § 1
of which established the rate also at eight
per cent. This was left unchanged
by
Comp. Laws 1907, § 1241.

Cross-Ref e,rences.
Payment
of interest
as extending
statute of limitations,
78-12-44.
Regulation by special laws prohibited,
Const. Art. VI, § 26.
In general.
Cited in Hansen v. Snell, 11 U. (2d) 64,
354 P. 2d 1070.
1.

2.

Pawnbrokers and mone,y lenders.
So far as 7-8-3, industrial loans, conflicts
with this section and chapter it must prevail, for the former legislation is a special
and subsequent act, and repeals "all laws
in conflict" therewith. People's Finance &
Thrift Co. v. Varney, 75 U. 355, 285 P. 304.
3.

Installments.
Where a note provided for payment of
interest in regular installments and maker
defaulted, such maker was liable for interest on sums in default at rate of eight
per cent, as fixed by this section. Jens en
v. Lichtenstein,
45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036.
(Prior to 1935 amendment.)
4.

Damages for breach of contract.
Eight per cent interest is not allowable
on damages recovered in action for breach
of contract;
only six per cent is allowable. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry v.
Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 U.
385, 140 P. 2d 344.
Debts overdue.
In Utah, interest is allowed on debts
overdue, even in absence of statute
or
contract providing therefor. Wasatch Min.
Co. v. Crescent Min. Co., 7 U. 8, 16, 24 P.
586, affd. 151 U.S. 317, 38 L. Ed. 177, 14
S. Ct. 348.

5.

6.

School districts.
School district, where it has received
benefit of goods, should pay legal rate
of interest from date it received benefit
of its contract.
Baker Lumber Co. v. A.
A. Clark Co., 53 U. 336, 178 P. 764.
7.

Extent of recovery by borrower.
Where one loaning money had received
full amount of money loaned and interest
at rate of 15 per cent per annum, debt

IN GENERAL

was fully paid, and lender could not recover anything
in addition.
Carter v.
West, 38 U. 381, 113 P. 1025.

8.

Determination of earning power of
money.
This rate cannot be used as a basis of
arriving at the reasonable earning power
of money; in estimating damages plaintiff
is entitled to in action for personal injuries. Klinge v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 89
U. 284, 286, 57 P. 2d 367, 105 A. L. R. 204.
9.

Eminent domain.
A condemnee is entitled to interest at
the rate of only six per cent from the
date of an order of immediate occupancy
to the date of judgment.
State v. Danielson, 122 U. 220, 247 P. 2d 900.
Collateral Reforences.
Interest<i>=>29.
47 C.J.S. Interest § 32.
Rate of interest, 30 Am. Jur. 25, Interest § 31 et seq.
Agreement to receive something other
than money for loan, 95 A. L. R. 1231.
Constitutionality,
construction,
and application of statutes regarding rate of interest during "emergency,"
147 A. L. R.
1023.
Expenses or charges (including taxes)
incident to loan of money, 63 A. L. R. 823.
Finance charge in connection with conditional sale contract as usury, 143 A. L.
R. 238.
Law of the forum as governing the right
to and rate of interest as damages for delay in payment of money or discharge of
other obligations, 78 A. L. R. 1047.
Rate of interest after maturity on con•
tract naming rate but not employing term
"until paid," or similar phrase, 75 A, L. R.
399.
Rate of interest after maturity on con•
tracts fixing rate "until payment," 6 A. L.
R. 1196.
Rate of interest after maturity on obligation which fixes rate of interest expressly until maturity, 16 A. L. R. 2d 902.
Statutes in relation to interest as obnoxious to constitutional provision against
impairing obligation of contracts, 87 A.
L. R. 462.
Validity and effect of anticipatory provision in con tract in relation to rate of
interest in event of default, 12 A. L. R.
367.

15-1-2. Maximum rates.-The
parties to any contract may agree in
writing for the payment of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or things in action, not to exceed ten per cent per annum;
provided:
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(a) That a loan or any renewal thereof except a loan made under
subsection (g) may specifically provide for a service charge, which charge
shall not exceed four per cent of the principal sum of said loan; such service charge shall not be subject to any additional charge or interest;
(b) That a loan may provide for reasonable collection costs and for a
reasonable attorney's fee in the event of default or delinquency;
(c) That on loans of money only, to the amount of $100 or less, it may
be agreed in writing to take or receive as interest on such loan not to
exceed $1 for the first month only of such loan, but thereafter no greater
interest shall be contracted for, taken or received than is allowed in this
section. This proviso shall not be construed to allow or permit the splitting
up of transactions for the loan of money into small amounts for the purpose of evading the provisions of this chapter:
( d) That licensees under the Utah Small Loan Act may contract for
and receive interest at the rates and subject to the limitations provided
in chapter 10, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
( e) That credit unions may contract for and receive interest and
charges at the rates and subject to the limits contained in chapter 9, Title
7, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
(f), That industrial loan corporations may contract for and receive
interest and charges at the rates subject to the limitations contained in
chapter 8, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
(g) That any corporation, except small loan licensees, operating under
the supervision of the state banking department of Utah, and any national
bank or federal savings and loan association doing business in the state
may add to or deduct in advance from the proceeds of any loan repayable
in installments over a period of not more than 63 months and not exceeding $5,000.00 in principal amount, interest or discount at a rate not exceeding seven per cent per annum upon the principal amount of the loan
for the entire period thereof; provided, however, such amount added on or
discounted shall be computed in accordance with rate charts yielding the
lender interest which shall not exceed 14% per annum. Provided further,
the debtor may satisfy in full the indebtedness on any installment date
before its final maturity and in so satisfying said indebtedness, shall receive a refund credit of unearned interest or discount computed in accordance with such reasonable formula based upon recognized commercial
practice as the state banking commissioner shall, by regulation prescribe;
provided further, that where the amount of such refund credit would be
less than $1, no refund need be made.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46. & 2; C. L.
1907, &1241x: C. L. 1917. § 3321: R. S.
1933, 44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42, & 1; C. 1943,
44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, § 1; 1955, ch. 20,
§ 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1935 amendment
reduced the rate
specified in the first sentence from 12 per
cent to 10 per cent and added two paragraphs relating
to handling
or service

charges and payment
of interest
in advance.
The 1953 amendment
made substantial
changes in the arrangement
of this section.
The 1955 amendment
made substantial
chang-es in the wordin!! and arranqement
of this section and added subds. (cl), (e),
(f). and (g).
The present
section bears little similarity to its predecessors,
except that it
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has always been provided that there may
be a conventional rate. R. S. 1898, § 1241
(now repealed); Comp. Laws 1907, § 1241x.

their voluntary acts, and not to inte-rest
imposed by statute. McFarlane v. Winters,
114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494.

Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1935, ch. 42: provided
that said act should take effect June 15,
1935.

7.

Cross-References.
Credit unions, rate allowed, 7-9-16.
Industrial
loan corporations,
rate allowed, 7-8-3.
Pawnbrokers,
rate allowed, 11-6-2.
Small loans, rate allo.wed on, 7-10-13.

Construction, purpose and validity.
The Usury Law does not operate retrospectively. Brunswick Realty Co. v. University Inv. Co., 43 U. 75, 134 P. 608.
Usury laws are enacted primarily for the
benefit of the borrower; the penalties are
not primarily for purpose of punishing the
lender. Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Min. Co.,
69 U. 41, 47, 252 P. 276.
1.

Defense of usury as personal to mortgagor.
In suit to foreclose corporate
mortgage, stockholder of mortgagor cannot interpose defense of usury predicated
on
gifts of stock to mortgagee by other stockholders which, if added to interest provided in mortgage, would make it usurious,
since defense of usury is personal to mortgagor. Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Min. Co.
(Grace et al., interveners),
69 U. 41, 252
P. 276.

8. Acceleration clause.
By the great weight of authority, it is
held that the inclusion, in a contract to
repay money, of a provision that, on default in the payment of the interest, or an
installment
of the principal,
the entire
indebtedness,
including interest
for the
whole term or interest to the date of default, shall become due, does not con2. Determination of usuriousness.
stitute usury though the amount of such
A contract, to be usurious, must be so interest will exceed the legal rate. The exwhen made, and it is essential that a corcess interest, however, is penal, and can
rupt or unlawful intent to violate .the
be neither collected nor retained.
Mathis
usury law, at least on the part of th,e . v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P.
lender, be proved to render a contract
2d 518, 522, quoting 84 A. L. R. 1283, and
usurious. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., adopting rule in instant case.
109 U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522.
9. Recovery on usurious contract.
3. Loan for less than one year.
In action against finance company to
Under former section one per cent a
recover principal and interest on alleged
month was precisely 12 per cent per anusurious
loan, demurrer
to complaint
num, and this was especially so where the
should have been sustained in absence of
loan was for less than a whole year. Brown
allegation that contract was made in Utah
v. Johnson, 43 U. 1, 7, 134 P. 590, 46 L.
or was subject to its laws. Farrer v. Atlas
R. A. (N. S.) 1157, Ann. Cas. 19160, 321.
Acceptance Corp., 97 U. 261, 92 P. 2d 729.
If it should appear that seller in a writ4. Detention of money.
ten conditional sales contract ·intended to
This section includes regulations
refacollect a sum as interest greater than altive to the detention of money. The term
lowed by law, the contract
would be
"forbearance"
includes detention.
Mathis
usurious. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co.,
v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P.
109· U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522 following
2d 518, 521.
and highly commending Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N. W. 2d 739,
5. Interest afte,r maturity.
152 A. L. R. 585.
Where the note provides for interest,,
after maturity of the entire balance, at
10. Validity of title of statute.
the highest lawful contract rate, and for
T11e title to this statute is not obnoxious
15 per cent of the principal and interest
to constitutional
requirements.
Morgan
of the note, or at the option of the holder,
Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, 101 U. 492,
a reasonable sum, as attorney's fees, this
124 P. 2d 778.
provision
does not violate
the usury
11. Exceptions.
statute, for it provides for the highest
lawful rate after. maturity of the entire
The rate of interest allowed industrial
obligation. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., loan companies is an exception to the rates
109 U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522.
provided for under this section. Seaboard
Finance Co. v. Wahlen, 123 U. 529, 260 P.
6. Usury law limited to transactions be- 2d 556, 557.
tween parties.
Utah code sections on usury apply to relatirmships between parties established .by

12. Intent of lender.
A corrupt or unlawful
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the usury law is a necessary element of
usury and must be proved. The intent to
constitute
usury is the intent to exact
payments which exceed the amount of interest allowed by the statute-not
the
specific intent
to violate
the statute.
Rossberg v. Holesapple, 123 U. 544, 260 P.
2d 563, 566. (Dissenting opinions 123 U.
544, 260 P. 2d 563, 569.)

13. Sale of credit.
A sale of credit, as distinguished
from
a loan of money, does not come within the
purview of usury laws. However, the mere
fact that the lender had to travel and use
his credit to borrow the necessary money
from a third party before he could make
available the funds to the borrower does
not make the transaction
between the
parties a sale or loan of credit instead
of a loan of money. Rossberg v. Holesapple, 123 U. 544, 260 P. 2d 563, 566. (Dissenting opinions 123 U. 544, 260 P. 2d 563,
569.)
Collateral References.
Intereste=-o29.
47 C.J.S. Interest § 32.

Rate of interest,
terest § 31 et seq.

30 Am. Jur.

25, In-

Computation,
as between vendor and
vendee under land contract,
of interest
upon deferred payments, 25 A. L. R. 2d
965.
Computation
of interest
chargeable
against executor or administrator
for delay in payment of legacies or distributive
shares, 18 A. L. R. 2d 1432.
Rate of interest after maturity on obligation which fixes rate of interest expressly until maturity,
16 A. L. R. 2d
902.
Retrospective
application and effect of
statutory provision for interest or changed
rate of interest, 4 A. L. R. 2d 932.

Law Reviews.
Usury in California, by William Tristam Coffin, 16 Calif. Law Review 281,
387.
Usury, by Raymond B. McConlogue, 1
S. Calif. Law Review 253.

15-1-2a. Conditional sales of tangible pe,rsonal property-Regulation o,f
contracts-Maximum rates.-A.. Definitions. A.s used in this act, unless the
context otherwise requires:
(1) "Conditional sale contract" shall mean:
(a) A.ny contract for the sale of any tangible personal property, with
or without accessories, under which possession is delivered to the buyer
but the title vests in the buyer thereafter only upon the payment of all
or part of the price, or upon the performance of any other condition.
(b) A.ny contract for the bailment or leasing of any tangible personal
property, with or without accessories, by which the bailee or lessee agrees
to pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to the value of the
property, and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to
become, or has the option of becoming the owner of the property upon
full compliance with the terms of the contract.
(c) A.ny contract for the sale of any tangible personal property, with
or without accessories, under which possession is delivered to the buyer,
and a lien on the property is to vest in the seller as security for the payment of part or all of the price, or for the performance of any other
condition.
(2) "Seller" shall mean the person who sells or leases the property
under a conditional sale contract.
(3) "Buyer" shall mean the person who buys or hires property under
a conditional sale contract, or any legal successor in an interest of su.ch
person.
( 4) "Person" shall mean and include an individual, company, firm,
association, partnership, trust, corporation, or other legal entity.
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(5) "Cash price" shall mean the amount for which the seller would
sell and transfer to the buyer unqualified title to the personal property
described in the conditional sale contract, if such property were sold for
cash at the seller's place of business on the date such contract is executed,
and includes any applicable tax.
(6) "Down payment" shall mean that part of the cash price which
the buyer pays or agrees to pay to the seller in cash or property value
or money's worth at or prior to delivery by the seller to the buyer of the
personal property described in the conditional sale contract.
(7) "Unpaid balance" shall mean the difference between (5) and (6)
above, plus the cost of insurance and optional benefits, if any, and all
fees paid or to be paid to any public officer, in connection with the transaction, which are included in the contract balance.
(8) "Time price differential" shall mean the amount by which seller's
total time price exceeds the aggregate of the cash sale price, the cost of
insurance and optional benefits, if any, and any other permissible cost
or expense incidental to the installment sale; and it shall be deemed a
component part of the seller's total time price, and not interest for the
forbearance, use or detention of money or credit even though given and
set forth in the contract as a separate item, along with other items as in
the next subsection required, it being in the interest of the public that
the buyer be informed and apprised of all of the items aggregating the
total time credit price at the time, or immediately after, the time credit
price has been agreed to by the parties to the transaction.
(9) "Contract balance" shall mean the amount unpaid under the conditional sale contract, which the buyer agrees to pay in installments as
provided therein.
(10) "Personal property" shall mean any tangible personal property,
specifically including any vehicle required to be registered under the Motor
Vehicle Act, as amended, of this state.
B. Requirements.
(1) Every conditional .sale contract for the time
sale of tangible personal property, with or without accessories, shall be
in writing and shall contain all of the agreements between the buyer and
the seller relating to the personal property described therein. It shall be
signed by the buyer or his authorized representative
and by the seller
or its authorized representative, and when so executed an exact copy thereof shall be delivered by the seller to the buyer at the time of its execution.
It shall recite the following separate items as such, in the following order:
(a) The cash price of the personal property described in the conditional sale contract.
(b) The amount of the buyer's down payment, and whether made in
cash or represented by the net agreed value of described property traded
in, or both, together with a statement of the respective amounts credited
for cash and for such property. Failure of the seller to comply with the
foregoing provision shall in no way affect the validity or enforceability of
the conditional sale contract.
( c) The amount unpaid on the cash price, which is the difference
between items (a) and (b) above.
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( d) The cost to the buyer of any insurance and optional benefits which
is included in the contract balance, provided that where the buyer had
insurance on personal property traded in, said buyer shall be entitled to
have said insurance transferred to the new personal property or vehicle
purchased under the act or to buy new insurance wherever he desires on
said new personal property or vehicle.
( e) A. description and itemization of amounts, if any, which will actually be paid by the seller or his assignee to any public officer as fees in
connection with the transaction, which are included in the contract balance.
(f) The amount of the unpaid balance, which is the sum of items ( c),
(d) and (e).
(g) The amount of the time price differential.
(h) The contract balance owed by the buyer to the seller, which is
the sum of items (f) and (g).
(i) The number of installments required to pay the contract balance,
the amount of each installment, and the date for payment of the installments.
(2) If any charge for insurance is included in the amount paid or
to be paid by the buyer under any conditional sale contract for the sale
of personal property, with or without accessories, an insurance policy or
policies or a certificate of insurance under a master policy shall be issued
and the seller shall within 30 days after the execution of the conditional
sale contract send or cause to be sent to the buyer the original or an exact
copy of such policy or policies or certificate.
(3) The amount of the time price differential in any conditional sale
contract for the sale of personal property, with or without accessories,
shall not exceed a sum in excess of 1 per cent of the unpaid balance multiplied by the number of months, including any excess fraction thereof as
one month, elapsing between the date of such contract and the due date
of the last installment, or five dollars ($5) or in the case of motor vehicles
fifteen dollars ($15), whichever is greater, provided that such contract
may provide for interest on any delinquent installment from and after the
date of delinquency, and for reasonable collection costs and fees in the
event of delinquency.
(4) A.ny provision in any conditional sale contract for the sale of
personal property to the contrary notwithstanding,
the buyer may satisfy
in full the indebtedness evidenced by such contract at any time before the
final maturity thereof, and in so satisfying such indebtedness shall receive
a refund credit thereon for such anticipation of payments. After first
deducting from such time price differential a minimum charge of not to
exceed five dollars ( $5) or in the case of motor vehicles [fifteen dollars]
($15), the amount of such refund shall represent at least 70% of that proportion of the time price differential as the sum of the periodic time balances after the month in which such contract is paid in full bears to the
sum of all the periodic time balances under the schedule of payments in
the contract, both sums to be determined according to the monthly balances

373

15-1-2a

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

which would result if the indebtedness were paid according to the terms
of the contract; provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection
shall not impair the right of the seller or his assignee to receive a minimum
time price differential of five dollars ($5) or in the case of motor vehicles
fifteen dollars ($15), or to receive interest on delinquent installments or
reasonable collection costs and fees, as provided in subdivision (3) of this
subsection; and provided further, that where the amount of such refund
credit would be less than one dollar ( $1), no refund need be made.
(5) If the seller, except as the result of an accidental or bona fide error
in computation, shall violate any provision of subdivisions (3) or ( 4) of
this subsection the conditional sale contract shall not be enforceable, except
by a holder, other than seller, of such contract, and the buyer, after return
of the property conditionally sold, may recover from the seller in a civil
action the total amount paid on the contract balance by the buyer to the
seller or his assignee pursuant to the terms of such contract.
If the seller, except as the result of an accidental or bona fide error
in computation, shall violate any other provision of this section, such failure
shall in no way affect the validity or enforceability of the conditional sale
contract. However, the buyer may recover from the seller in a civil action
an amount equal to the time price differential as set forth in the contract.
( 6) If the holder, other than seller, of such contract, except as the
result of an accidental or bona fide error in computation, shall violate any
provision of subdivision ( 4) of this subsection, the buyer, after return
of the property conditionally sold, may recover from such holder in a
civil action the total amount paid on the contract balance by the buyer
to such holder pursuant to the terms of such contract.
(7) The provisions of this act shall not apply to sales as defined herein
in which the cash price is greater than $7,500.00, nor to the sale of personal
property as a component part of a contract for the sale of real estate.
History:
C. 1953, 15-1-2a, enacted
L. 1953, ch. 24, § 2.

by

Compiler's Note.
The bracketed
words "fifteen dollars"
in subd. B(4) were inserted by the compiler.
Title of Act.
An act to amend section 15-1-2, Utah
Code Annotated
1953, relating to maximum rates; and enacting a new section to
be known as section 15-l-2a, Utah Code
Annotated
1953; providing for the regulation of contracts for the conditional sale
of tangible personal property and providing for the maximum rates to be, charged
in connection
therewith
and providing
penalties for violations.
Cross-References.
Chattel mortgages title, conditional sales
excepted, 9-1-15.
Livestock, leases and sales of, 25-3-1 et
seq.

Railroad equipment, conditional sales of,
56-1-23, 56-1-24.
Uniform Sales Act, 60-1-1 et seq.

In general.
Cited in Seaboard Finance Co. v. Wahlen, 123 U. 529, 260 P. 2d 556, 559.
1.

2. Interpretation of subdivision B(5).
A conditional sales contract was enforceable by the seller, even though it was not
signed by the seller, since the failure to
meet this requirement does not affect the
validity of the contract under subd. B(5).
Dusenberry v. Taylor's, 7 U. (2d) 383, 325
P. 2d 910.
This provision seems almost absurd since
a literal interpretation
compels the conclusion that a conditional sale contract authorized by the statute is enforceable even
though matters
couched in mandatory
language be omitted, but is une,nforceable
if the seller made an accidental or bona
fide error in computation. Dusenberry v.
T'aylor's, 7 U. (2d) 383-, 325 P. 2d 910.
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Collateral References.
Intereste;,,29,
47 C.J.S. Interest § 32.
Conditional sales, 47 Am. Jur. 6 et seq.,
Sales § 827 et seq.
Buyer's rights, after repossession
by
conditional vendor, as to payments made,
37 A. L. R. 100, 83 A. L. R. 965, 99 A.
L. R. 1292, 49 A. L. R. 2d 15.

15-1-4

Construction and effect of contract for
sale of commodity or goods wherein quantity is described as "about" or "more or
less" than amount specified, 58 A. L. R. 2d
377.
What amounts to a conditional sale, 17
A. L. R. 1421, 43 A. L. R. 1247, 92 A. L.
R. 304, 175 A. L. R. 1366.

15-1-3. Calculated by the year.-Whenever
in any statute or deed, or
written or verbal contract, or in any public or private instrument whatever,
any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated,
interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned by the year.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C. L. 1907,
§ 1241x5; C. L. 1917, § 332.6; R. S. 1933 &
c. 1943, 44-0-3.

Collateral References.
Intereste;,,4o.
47 C.J.S. Interest § 42.
Construction of contractual
prov1s10ns
as to interest as regards time from which
interest is to be computed, 69 A. L. R.
958.
Time at which interest is payable under

will or contract providing for payment of
interest, 10 A. L. R. 997.
Time from which interest begins to run
on fidelity or public officer's bond, 57 A.
L. R. 2d 1317.
Time from which interest is chargeable
against
cotenant
accountable
for rents
and profits or use and occupation, 51 A.
L. R. 2d 398, 411.
Time from which interest is recoverable
on demand note or like demand instrument containing no prnvision as to interest, 45 A. L. R. 2d 1202.

15-1-4. Interest on judgments.-Any judgment rendered on a lawful
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall
bear interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C. L. 1907,
§ 124lx9; C. L. 1917, § 3330; R. S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 44-0-4.
Compiler's Note.
Analogous former
1898, § 1241.

statute,

see

R.

S.

Cross-Reference,,
Interest to be included in judgment entry, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e).
Construction and operation generally.
It is only to personal judgments that
this section applies. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Bldg.
& Improvement Co., 20 U. 267, 58 P. 843.
This section provides that judgment,
which is not upon obligation whe,re rate
of interest is fixed, shall bear interest at
rate of 8 per cent per annum. McFarlane
v. Winters, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494.
Utah Code does not prevent inclusion
of interest due as part of principal of
judgment to be rendered.
McFarlane
v.
Winters, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494, construing this section.
1.

2.

Allowance of inte,rest before judgment.
The true test to be applied as to whether
or not interest should be allowed, before
judgment in given case, is not whether
damages are unliquidated
or otherwise,
but whether injury and consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained
as of particular
time and in accordance
with fixed rules of evidence. Fell v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 32 U. 101, 88 P. 1003, 28
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 13 Ann. Cas. 1137.
3.

Interest on damages.
Award of interest at legal rate on damages suffered by reason of breach of building contract from time they were suffered,
held proper as against contention
that
since damages were unliquidated,
no interest could be allowed until after judgment. Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v.
Board of Education of Jordan School Dist.,
61 U. 149, 211 P. 981.
4.

Estates of decedents.
Where widower
and executrix
both
claimed certain
moneys on deposit in
bank and stipulated
that such money
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should remain in bank at four per cent
interest
until outcome of litigation
to
determine rights to such money, executrix
was not entitled to additional
four per
cent on judgment from time it was rendered to time remittitur
was filed after appeal by widower.
Evancovich
v. Schiller,
83 U. 1, 26 P. 2d 830.

Amendment of judgment.
Judgment revised to include interest at
statutory
rate where Supreme Court had
inadvertently
omitted it from its opinion.
Keller v. Chournos, 95 U. 31, 79 P. 2d 86.
5.

6.

Renewal of judgment.
Computation in renewing, from time to
time, judgment founded on tort for personal injury and property damage, so as
to include total sum of previous judgment
plus unpaid interest thereby giving interest upon interest, was not erroneous under
this section as compounding interest or as
usurious, since usury sections of Code do
not apply to interest imposed by statute.
McFarlane v. Winte.rs, 114 U. 502, 201 P.
2d 494.
7.

Eminent domain.
Until the amount of damages sustained
by a condemnee is determined, there is no
judgment which will bear interest within
the meaning
of this section.
State v.
Danielson, 122 U. 220, 247 P. 2d 900.
8.

Reinstatement of judgment.
Where plaintiff's judgment on jury verdict was subsequently
set aside by trial
court and later reinstated on appeal, plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of

IN GENERAL

entry of judgment on verdict and not from
the date of Inter reinstatement.
Hewitt v.
General Tire & Rubber Co., 5 U. (2d) 379,
302 P. 2d 712.

9.

Interest during pendency of appeal.
Where no tender of payment was made,
interest accrued on a money judgment of a
federal court during the pendency on an
appeal to the Court of Appeals and effort
to obtain further review by the Supreme
Court. ·woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 290 F.
2d 186.
10. Interest on judgment in federal court.
When the jurisdiction of a United States
court is based upon diverse citizenship and
interest is not specifically
fixed in some
other and binding manner, the law of the
state controls the allowance of interest.
Woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 290 F. :ld 186.
Collateral References.
Interest<e:=38 (1).
47 C.J.S. Interest
§ 40.
Interest
on judgments
and decrees, 30
Am. Jur. 39, Interest § 49.
Date of verdict or date of entry of
judgment thereon as beginning of interest
period on judgment, 1 A. L. R. 2d 479.
Interest on decree or judgment of probate court allowing a claim against estate or making an allowance fol' se!'vices,
54 A. L. R. 2d 814.
Intel'est
on judgment
awarding interpleaded or impleaded disputed funds, 15
A. L. R. 2d 483.
Right to interest
on unpaid alimony,
33 A. L. R. 2d 1455.

15-1-5. Usury-Taking excessive interest a misdemeanor.-No person
shall, directly or indirectly, take or receive in services, money or other
property, any greater sum or greater value for the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods or things in action than is prescribed in section 15-1-2.
A.ny person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 3; C. L. 1907,
§ 1241xl; L. 1909, ch. 81, § 1; C. L. 1917,
§ 3322; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-5.

Compiler's Note.
The reference in this section to "section
15-1-2" appeared in Code 1943 as "section
44-0-2."
Waiver.
The usury statute was made for benefit
of borrower and he may waive its provisions. Conner v. Smith, 51 U. 129, 169 P.
158.
1.

2.

Criminal prosecutions.
In order to convict under

this

upon a criminal charge, no doubt proof
beyond a reasonable
doubt would he requil'ecl. Cobb v. Hartenstein,
47 U. 174,
187, 152 P. 424.

Collateral References.
U surye=:,149 (1).
91 C.J.S. Usuary § 160.
Generally, 55 Am. Jur.
et seq.

323, Usury § I

Practice of exacting usury as nuisance
for ground for injunction,
66 A. L. R.
1078.

section
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15-1-6. Repealed.
Repeal.
This section (L. 1907, ch. 46, § 5; C. L.
1907, § 1241x3; C. L. 1917, § 3324; R. S.
1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-6), relating to the

voiding of usurious contracts and securities, was repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 21,
§ 2.

15-1-7. Usury-Forfeiture of all interest-Triple damages for interest
already paid-Limitation of action.-The taking, receiving, reserving, or
charging of a rate of interest greater than is allowed by section 15-1-2,
shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or
other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid
thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has been paid the person
by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back
three times the amount of the interest thus paid from the receiver or taker
thereof and reasonable attorney fees, provided that such action is commenced within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 4; C. L. 1907,

§ 1241x2; C. L. 1917, § 3323; R. S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 44-0-7; L. 1955, ch. 21, § 1.
Compiler's Note.
Prior to the 1955 amendment this section read: "Every person, or in the event
of his death his personal representative,
who shall pay or deliver any greater sum
or value than is allowed by this chapter
to be received for or on any loan or
forbearance, or who shall pay the principal or any part thereof of a usurious
loan or forbearance, may recover from the
person who shall have taken or received
the same the amount of money so paid
or value delivered, both of. principal and
interest, provided action is brought within
one year after such payment or delivery.
If such action is not brought within said
one year and prosecuted with diligence,
then the superintendent
of public instruction may sue for and recover such sums,
with costs, at any time within three years
after said one year, for the use and benefit of the state district school fund, and
the sum so collected shall be forthwith paid
into said fund."
Repealing Clause.
Section 2 of Laws 1955, ch. 21, provided as follows: "Sections 15-1-6, 15-1-8
and 15-1-9 Utah Code Annotated 1953, are
hereby repealed."
Savings Clause.
Section 3 of Laws 1955, ch. 21, provided as follows:
"Nothing herein shall
affect any action filed before the effective
date of this act."
1. Validity.
The title of the original act is sufficiently broad to cover this section. Cobb
v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 152 P. 424.

2.

Application in general.
The provisions of this section are sufficiently broad to include a usurious conditional sales contract, as well as other
usurious contracts.
Morgan Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, 101 U. 492, 124 P. 2d
778, followed and approved in Mathis v.
Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P.
2d 518.
This section prohibits taking of interest
on finance charge.
Mathis v. Holland
Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 520.
Recovery of principal and interest.
Notwithstanding
the fact that this section provides for suit by the borrower or
his "personal representatives,"
a surviving
partner may maintain the action under the
authority of 75-11-9. Cobb v. Hartenstein,
47 U. 174, 152 P. 424, cited with approval
in Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 U.
449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522.
In action against finance company to
recover principal and interest on alleged
usurious
loan, demurrer
to complaint
should have been sustained in absence of
allegation that contract was made in Utah
or was subject to its laws.
Farrer v.
Atlas Acceptance Corp., 97 U. 261, 92 P.
2d 729.
3.

4.

- limitations.
A person who has paid money or has
delivered "things in action" in excess of
the rate fixed by the preceding section
may sue for and recover back both "principal and interest," if the action is brought
within the time prescribed by this section.
Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 152 P. 424.
Action by borrower of money on usurious contract to recover pledged property
was not governed by limitation provision
of this section but by Code 1943, 104-2-24.
Conner v. Smith, 51 U. 129, 169 P. 158.
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Code, 78-

5.

- evidence.
Burden of proof is on him who alleges
usury to establish it by at least clear and
convincing evidence, and not merely by a
preponderance thereof.
Brown v. Johnson,
43 U. 1, 13, 134 P. 590, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1157, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 321.
In a proceeding under this section to
recover back payments of usury, plaintiff
need not establish the case by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt; the evidence,
however, must be strong, clear and convincing.
Cobb v. Hartenstein,
47 U. 174,
152 P. 424.

Collateral References.
Usury-Pl 09.
91 C.J.S. Usury § 142 et seq.
Recovery of payment, 55 Am. Jur. 401,
Usury § 111 et seq.
Acceptance of secret compensation
by
bank officer or employee in making loan
by bank as charging bank with usury, 52
A. L. R. 2d 703.
Agreement releasing cause of action or
defense based on exaction of usury, validity, construction
and effect, 99 A. L. R.
600.
Assignment of pa1·t of amount due or
to fall due upon money obligation as sale
or loan for purposes of Usury Law, 165
A. L. R. 626.
Availability
of setoff, counterclaim,
or
the like to recover either penalty for
usury in, or usurious interest
paid on,
separate
transaction
or instrument,
54
A. L. R. 2d 1344.
Borrower's fraud contributing
to execution of usurious
contract
as affecting
rights or remedies of parties, 63 A. L. R.
962.
Computing interest on basis of 360 days
in year, 30 days in month, or the like,
as usury, 35 A. L. R. 2d 842.,
Delay in paying over proceeds of loan to
borrower as affecting question of usury, 76
A. L. R. 1467.
Effect on indebtedness
originally valid
of usurious forbearance,
renewal, or extension, 3 A. L. R. 877.
Expenses or charges in form of commissions to agents, brokers, or like intermediaries incident to loan of money, 52 A. L.
R. 2d 703.
Fixed interest charge for uncertain term
as usury, 3 A. L. R. 1385.
Leaving part of loan on deposit with
lender as usury, 12 A. L. R. 1422.
Negotiable Instruments Law as affecting
defense of usury, 95 A. L. R. 735.
Obligations covering deferred payments
of purchase money or extension thereof
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as loan or forbearance within Usury Law,
91 A. L. R. 1105.
Parol-evidence rule as affecting extrinsic
evidence to show or to negative usury, 82
A. L. R. 1199, 104 A. L. R. 1261.
Payment or offer to pay principal and
legal interest as condition of relief, in
equity, against usurious contract, 70 A.
L. R. 693, 135 A. L. R. 808, 166 A. L. R.
458.
Periodic advance interest payments during time of loan as usury, 57 A. L. R. 2d
656.
Provision for interest after maturity at
a rate in excess of legal rate as usurious,
82 A. L. R. 1213.
Recovery of cumulative statutory penalties for usury transactions,
71 A. L. R. 2d
1011.
Release of borrower prior to maturity
of loan, as affecting usury, by taking or
charging interest in advance, 57 A. L. R.
2d 674.
Requiring
borrower to pay insurance
premium on property mortgaged as security as usury, 53 A. L. R. 761.
Right of a purchaser assuming a mortgage debt, with the authorization
of the
mortgagor, to set up usury in mortgage as
a defense or rely upon it as a ground of
relief in equity, 82 A. L. R. 1153.
Right of guarantor
or surety for corporation to set up usury where corporation
could not, 63 A. L. R. 2d 924.
Right of junior mortgagee to attack senior mortgage for usury, 59 A. L. R. 342,
121 A. L. R. 879.
Right of surety or guarantor to avail
himself of defense of usury, 70 A. L. R.
359.
Right to have usurious payments made
on previous obligation applied as payment
of principal on renewal, 13 A. L. R. 1244.
Taking or charging interest in advance
as usury, 57 A. L. R. 2d 630.
Transaction in form a sale, but accompanied by an agreement or option for repurchase by the vendor or a third person
previously interested, as a loan as regards
Usury Law, 154 A. L. R. 1063.
Usurious loan agreement
as affecting
collateral transaction
or instrument not
otherwise usurious, 75 A. L. R. 1344.
Usurious nature of provision in promissory note as evidence of indebtedness for
payment, as attorneys' fees, expenses, and
costs of collection, of specified percentage
of note, 17 A. L. R. 2d 295, 316.
Usury as affecting conditional sale contract, 152 A. L. R. 598.
Usury as effected by delay in delivering
principal to borrower, 57 A. L. R. 2d 663.
Validity of agreement to pay interest
on interest, 76 A. L. R. 1484.
Waiver of usury by renewal or other
executory agreement, 74 A. L. R. 1184.
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15-1-8, 15-1-9. Repealed.
Repeal.
These sections (L. 1907, ch. 46, §§ 6, 10;
C. L. 1907, §§ 124lx4, 124lx8; C. L. 1917,

§§ 3325, 3329; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-8,
44-0-9), relating to usurious loans, were
repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 21, § 2.

15-1-10. Usury-Discounting negotiable paper.-The
discount, sale and
transfer, in the regular course of business, of negotiable paper by one not
the maker thereof, without intent to violate this chapter, shall not be construed as usurious.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 12; C. L. 1907,
§ 1241x10; C. L. 1917, § 3331; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 44-0-10.

Compiler's Note.
The reference in this section to "this
chapter" appeared in Code 1943 as "this
title."

2.

Usurious contracts.
The general rules governing
usurious
contracts are stated in Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 152 P. 424.

Collateral References.
Usurye::>26.
91 C.J.S. Usury § 14.

Cross-References.
Negotiable instruments, Title 44.
Promise to pay a sum certain may ininclude interest, 44-1-2.
1. Bona fide purchaser of note.
One purchasing note for valuable consideration without notice of any of its
infirmities, and without intent to evade
provisions of statute relating to usury, was
entitled to enforce collection
of note.
Rosenblum v. Gomoll, 52 U. 206, 173 P.
243.

Usury as predicable upon transaction in
form a sale or exchange of commercial
paper or other choses in action, 165 A. L.
R. 626.

Law Review.
Evasions Through Exactions Other Than
Interest-Discounted
Interest as Usury, by
Anthony L. Styskal, 18 S. Calif. Law Review 274.

CHAPTER 2
LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN
Section 15-2-1.
15-2-2.
15-2-3.
15-2-4.

Period of minority.
Liability for necessaries and on contracts-Disaffirmance.
Limitation on right to disaffirm.
Payment for personal services.

15-2-1. Period of minority.-The period of minority extends in males
to the age of twenty-one years and in females to that of eighteen years;
but all minors obtain their majority by marriage.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1541;
C. L. 1917, § 3955; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
14-1-1.
Cross-References.
Actions by or against, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 17 (b) ( c).
Earnings of minor child of debtor exempt from execution, 78-23-1, par. (12).
Employment of minors, 34-4-1 et seq.,
34-5-1 et seq.
Guardians ad litem, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17 (b) ( c).
Limitations, effect of disability on running of statute, 78-12-20, 78-12-21, 78-1236, 78-12-42, 78-12-43.

Marriageable
age, 30-1-2, 30-1-17.
Parent or guardian, when may sue, 7811-5.
Service of process on minor, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e) (2).
Workmen's compensation, injured minors
deemed sui juris, 35-1-89.
Workmen's compensation, minor children
as beneficiaries, 35-1-73.

Age of majority.
The age of majority for females in this
state is 18. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80
U. 9, 13, 12 P. 2d 364.
1.
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Period of infancy,
fants § 3 et seq.

2.

Prosecution for carnal knowledge.
In prosecution for carnal knowledge of
female over age of 13 years and under
age of 18 years, fact that female had
attained
her majority
through marriage·
was not a defense to the charge. State v.
Huntsman, 115 U. 283, 204 P. 2d 448.
3.

Driver's license-Parent's
liability.
The words "such minor" as used throughout section 41-2-10 concerning liability of
persons signing application
for driver's
license for minor refers to persons under
age of 18 years, and not to "minors" as
term is defined in this section. Rogers v.
Wagstaff, 120 U. 136, 232 P. 2d 766, 26
A. L. R. 2d 1316.
Where father
signed application
for
driver's license for daughter, 16 years old,
and within a year was divorced from his
wife with custody of the daughter being
given to his wife, and a mouth after the
divorce the daughter was married, statutory liability imposed on father by 41-2-10
for injuries resulting from negligent driving of daughter
was not affected by
daughter's marriage or by the change in
her custody, notwithstanding
statute conferring majority upon marriage.
Rogers
v. Wagstaff, 120 U. 136, 232 P. 2d 766,
26 A. L. R. 2d 1316.
Collateral References.
In fan tse=c,10.
43 C.J.S. Infants § 29.

27 Am. Jur. 747, In-

Applicability
of criminal statutes
relating to offenses against children of a
specified age with respect to a child who
has passed the anniversary
date of such
age, 73 A. L. R. 2d 874.
Emancipation
by parent
as affecting
right of infant to change domicile or settlement, 5 A. L. R. 949.
Inclusion or exclusion of day of birth in
determining of attainment
of majority, 5
A. L. R. 2d 1147.
Minor as subject to constructive
or
substituted
service of process under statutes providing for such service on nonresident motorists, 53 A. L. R. 2d 1193..
Power of infant, on death of both parents, to change domicile, 32 A. L. R. 2d
868.
Right of child to sue parent or person in
loco parentis for personal tort, 19 A. L.
R. 2d 423.
Right of one in loco parentis other than
teacher to punish child, 43 A. L. R. 507.
Right to appellate review of consent
judgment involving infant, 69 A. L. R. 2d
791.
Statutory change of age of majority as
affecting pre-existing rights, 170 A. L. R.
222.
Tort liability of child of tender years,
67 A. L. R. 2d 570.

15-2-2. Liability for necessaries and on contracts--Disafflrmance.-A
minor is bound not only for reasonable value of necessaries but also by
his contracts, unless he disaffirms them before or within a reasonable time
after he attains his majority and restores to the other party all money
or property received by him by virtue of said contracts and remaining
within his control at any time after attaining his majority.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1542;
C. L. 1917, § 3956; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
14-1-2.

Cross-References.
Bank deposits, minors may make and
draw, 7-3-46.
Credit unions, shares may be issued to
minors, 7-9-15.
Earnings of minor child of debtor exempt from execution, 78-23-1, par. (12).
Limitations,
effect of disability on running of statute, 78-12-20, 78-12-21, 78-1236, 78-12-42, 78-12-43.
Negotiable
instruments,
effect of endorsement or assignment by minor, 44-1-23.
Sales Act, liability of minor for necessaries under, 60-1-2.
Stock Transfer Act not to enlarge powers of minors, 16-3-2.

Contracts contemplated by section.
This section was meant to apply to only
such contracts as were beneficial to the
infant, and probably was not intended to
apply to contracts where infant was not
the principal therein, but, for example,
was me1·ely a surety. Groesbeck v. Bell, 1
U. 338.
It is not unlawful to sell an automobile
to a minor. Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 73 U.
1, 19, 272 P. 207, applying Comp. Laws
1917, § 3956.
1.

2. Disaffirmance of contract-Time of.
What
constitutes
"reasonable
time"
under this section is a question of fact
for the jury. Groesbeck v. Bell, 1 U. 338.
In action on note against minor who had
signed as cosigner, where disaffirmance in
answe1· was filed by guardian ad !item four
months after minor attained majority and
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in amended answer by minor six months
after attaining majority, disaffirmance was
made within reasonable time. Merchants'
Credit Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U.
364, 230 P. 1017.
No hard and fast rule can be stated
regarding precise time within which minor
may disaffirm his contract and much depends upon intelligence
of minor, his
means of knowledge, nature of and his relation to the transaction, and purpose to be
attained
thereby.
Merchants'
Credit
Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U. 364, 230
P. 1017.

3. - form or manner of disaffirmance.
Since no particular form of disaffirmance
is necessary, attorney, acting as guardian
ad !item in action against minor on note
could disaffirm in answer.
Merchants'
Credit Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U.
364, 230 P. 1017.
4. - return of property or consideration.
On disaffirmance of contract, all infant
is required to restore is money or property
received by him under contract remaining
within his control at any time after attaining his majority, but minor may not retain
property indefinitely, and he must elect to
disaffirm and comply with statutory provision within reasonable time after attaining
his majority.
Blake v. Harding, 54 U. 158,
180 P. 172.
It is not the law that infant may not
disaffirm and recover if property he has
received has become worthless, since to so
hold is to impose duty upon infant to
place other party to contract in exact
statu quo, and adult, in dealing with
minor, assumes all risk of loss. Blake v.
Harding, 54 U. 158, 180 P. 172.
Plaintiff, an infant, had right to disaffirm sale or exchange of property, and
hence value of property he received and
offered to return to defendant was necessarily immaterial.
Blake v. Harding, 54
U. 158, 180 P. 172.
Where minor has not received property
or has squandered it during his minority,
he is not required to restore it in order to
effectuate disaffirmance. Merchants' Credit
Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U. 364, 230
P. 1017.
Collateral References.
Infants<t:=>58( 2).
43 C.J.S. Infants § 75.
Agreements for necessaries,
758, Infants § 16 et seq.

27 Am. Jur.

Absence from, or inability
to attend,
school or college as affecting liability for,
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or right to recover back payments
on
account of tuition or board, 69 A. L. R.
714.
Automobile or motorcycle as a necessary
for infant, 78 A. L. R. 392.
Capacity of minor insured to effect a
change of beneficiary, 14 A. L. R. 2d 375.
Civil liability of father for necessaries
furnished to child taken from home by
mother, 32 A. L. R. 1466.
Failure to disaffirm as ratification of infant's executory contract, 5 A. L. R. 2d 7.
Infant's liability in tort for own act, or
right to recover for another's
tort, as
affected by its connection with infant's
contract, 127 A. L. R. 1441.
Liability of infant for medical, dental,
or hospital services to him, 71 A. L. R. 226.
Liability of infant for necessaries where
he lives with his parents, 70 A. L. R. 572.
Liability of infant or his estate for rent,
68 A. L. R. 1185.
Liability of parent for dental services to
minor child, 7 A. L. R. 1070.
Measure of infant's recovery for value
of chattel traded for another upon his
rescission of the transaction,
52 A. L. R.
2d 1114.
Right of infant to disaffirm his sale of
personalty and recover it from third person purchasing without notice of infancy,
16 A. L. R. 2d 1420.
Right of infant to repudiate contract for
services to recover thereon or in quantum
meruit, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1302.
Right to recover for money loaned to
infant to purchase necessaries, 65 A. L. R.
1337.
Rights in respect of engagement
and
courtship presents to infant donee when
marriage does not ensue, 24 A. L. R. 2d
599.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute making contract approved by court
binding on infant, 3 A. L. R. 2d 702.

Law Reviews.
Statutory Problems in the Law of Minor's Contracts, 48 Columbia Law Review
272.
Liability of the Infant in Contract, 20
Iowa Law Review 785.
Is a College Education a Legal Necessityi
L. B. Howard, 34 Ohio Bar 295.
Avoidance by Infants of Contracts for
Performance of Services, 21 Rocky Mountain Law Review 213, case note, Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brode!, 31 Cal. 2d
766, 192 P. 2d 949.
The Status of Infancy as a Defense to
Contracts, 34 Virginia Law Review 829.

15-2-3. Limitation on right to disaffirm.,-N o contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentations
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as to his majority or from his having engaged in business as adult, the other
party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.
History:
R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1543;
C. L. 1917, § 3957; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
14-1-3.
Collateral References.
Infantse=o56.
43 C.J.S. Infants § 27.
Avoidance of infants' contracts,
Jur. 771, Infants § 33 et seq.

27 Am.

Right of infant to disaffirm his sale of
personalty as against third person purchas-

ing without
2d 1420.

notice of infancy,

16 A. L. R.

Law Reviews.
Limitation
on Minors' Common Law
Power to Disaffirm Contract, 16 Chicago
Law Review 183, case note, Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766,
192 P. 2d 949.
Infants'
Contracts and Their Enforcement, 35 Washington Law Review 465.

15-2-4. Payment for personal services.-When a contract for the personal services of a minor has been made with him alone, and those services are afterward performed, payment made therefor to such minor in
accordance with the terms of the contract is a full satisfaction for those
services, and the parent or guardian cannot recover therefor a second time.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1544;
C. L. 1907, § 3958; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
14-1-4.
1.

Operation and effect of section.
Although this section protects the employer against claims of the parent, if he
pays the wages to the minor, "in the absence of statute to the contrary, a minor
cannot in his own name and right maintain
an action on such contract.
In short, generally speaking, a minor is not sui juris."
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry,
108 U. 1, 156 P. 2d 885, 889.

2.

Earnings of minor.
Earnings of minor do not absolutely

be-

long to parent, and minor could recover
for injuries suffered while employed, where
minor supported
himself from his own
earnings and parents made no claim. Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co.,
52 U. 116, 172 P. 725.
Collateral References.
InfantsP49.
43 C.J.S. Infants § 85.
Services of infants, 27 Am. Jur.
Infants § 30.

770,

Liability for services of child taken into
home without express agreement for com·
pensation, 7 A. L. R. 2d 8.

CHAPTER 3
INTERPARTY AGREEMENTS
Section

15-3-1.
15-3-2.
15-3-3.
15-3-4. ·

Conveyances, releases, sales by persons acting jointly.
Contracts not discharged by merger in obligor and obligee.
Fraudulent transactions
not validated.
Effective date of chapter.

15-3-1. Conveyances, releases, sales by persons acting jointly.-A. conveyance, release or sale may be made to or by two or more persons acting
jointly and one or more, but less than all, of these persons acting either
by himself or themselves or with other persons; and a contract may be
made between such parties.
History:
L. 1929, ch. 74, § 1; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 45-0-1.

Maryland,
Utah.

Comparable Provisions.
States that have adopted the Model Interparty
Agreement Act are as follows:

Cross-References.
Grant to two or more as creating
ancy in common, 57-1-5.
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Nevada,

Pennsylvania

and

ten-

JOINT OBLIGATIONS
Tenants in common or joint tenants as
parties to actions, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 20(a).

Decisions from other Jurisdictions-Pennsylvania.
The words "other persons," in this statute, should be interpreted
to include the
husband or wife of a grantor in a deed of
conveyance.
In re Vandergrift's
Estate,
105 Pa. Sup. Ct. 293, 161 A. 898.
One of the manifest purposes of this
statute is to enable one person to make a
conveyance of his land to another person

15-4-1

jointly with himself and in that manner
to divest himself of his entire estate therein. In re Vandergrift's
Estate, 105 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 293, 161 A. 898.
In a case where it was determined that
deed of husband to wife created a tenancy
in common and not a tenancy by the entireties, this act was held to have had no
application.
In re Walker's Estate, 340
Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28.
Collateral References.
Contracts<§:::;;>13.
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 26.

15-3-2. Contracts not discharged by merger in obligor and obligee.-No
contract shall be discharged because after its formation the obligation and
the right thereunder become vested in the same person, acting in different
capacities as to the right and the obligation.
History:
L. 1929, ch. 74, § 2; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 45-0-2.

15-3-3. Fraudulent
validate a transaction
tively fraudulent.

transactions not validated.-N othing herein shall
within its provisions which is actually or construc-

History:
L. 1929, ch. 74, § 3; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 45-0-3.

15-3-4. Effective date of chapter.-This
chapter shall not apply to conveyances, releases, sales or contracts made prior to July 1, 1929.
History:

L. 1929, ch. 74, § 4; R. S. 1933

& C. 1943, 45-0-4.

CHAPTER 4
JOINT

OBLIGATIONS

Section 15-4-1. Defini.tions.
15-4-2. Discharge of co-obligors by judgment.
15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor.
15-4-4. Release of co-obligor-Reservation
of rights.
15-4-5. Release of co-obligor-Effect
of knowledge of obligee.
15-4-6. Death of joint obligor-Survivorship.
15-4-7. Effective date of chapter.

15-4-1. Definitions.-In this chapter, unless otherwise expressly stated,
"obligation" includes a liability in tort; "obligor" includes a person liable
for a tort; "obligee" includes a person having a right based on a tort;
"several obligors" means obligors severally bound for the same performance.
History:

L. 1929, ch. 61, § 1; R. S. 1933

& C. 1943, 47-0-1.

Compiler's Note.
The reference in this section to "this
chapter" appeared in the Revised Statutes
of 1933 as "this title."

Comparable Provisions.
States that have adopted the Model
Joint Obligations Act are as follows:
Hawaii, Nevada, New York and Wisconsin.
Cross-References.
Appearance by single obligor, service on
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remainder, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
4(b).
Assignments
for benefit of creditors,
preferences by joint obligors, 6-1-20.
Contribution
between
joint debtors,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(h).
Execution
of judgments
against joint
obligors, Rules of .Civil Procedure, Rule 69.
Joinder of joint obligors, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 20(a).
Service of process on joint obligors, failure to serve all, effect, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 71B(b).

In general.
Cited in United States v. First Security
Bank, 208 F. 2d 424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d
951.

1.

2.

Purpose of statutes.
Statutory
provisions for the release of
co-obligors are meant to relieve a coobligor whei·e, and to the extent,
his
o bligee has released another co-o bligor to
his detriment.
Plateau Uranium Investment Corp. v. Sugar & Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5,
326 P. 2d 1022.
Release of joint tort-feasor or joint
obligor.
In personal injury action, where plaintiff
accepted a substantial sum from defendant
in consideration of promise not to sue defendant for injuries sustained in accident,
and thereafter
dismissed his suit against
defendant,
trial court properly deducted
such sum from judgment rendered against
3.

remaining codefendants.
Green v. Lang
Co., Inc., 115 U. 128, 206 P. 2d 626.
Collateral References.
Contracts~l83.
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 352.
Joint and several tort-feasors,
52 Am.
Jur. 448, Torts § 110 et seq.
Joint contracts, 12 Am. Jur. 814, Contracts § 268 et seq.
Conflict of laws regarding contribution
between tort-feasors,
148 A. L. R. 1130.
Grant of new trial, or reversal of judgment on appeal as to one joint tort-feasor,
as requiring new trial or reversal as to
other tort-feasor, 143 A. L. R. 7.
Judgment for plaintiff in action in tort
or contract against codefendants,
as conclusive in subsequent action between codefendants as to the liability of both or the
liability of one and the nonliability of the
other, 142 A. L. R. 727.
Release of ( or covenant not to sue) one
tol't-feasor as affecting liability of others,
148 A. L. R. 1270.
Right of defendant
in tort action to
have another joint tort-feasor
brought in
for purposes of enforcing contribution
or
indemnity or for showing liability of the
latter to the plaintiff, as affected by fact
that plaintiff's right of action against the
person sought to be brought in was barred
by lapse of time, 149 A. L. R. 1186.
Right of tor t-f ea so r to contribution
where judgment creditor is spouse, parent,
child, etc., of other tort-feasor
against
whom contribution
is sought, 19 A. L. R.
2d 1003.

15-4-2. Discharge of co-obligors by judgment.-A judgment against one
or more of several obligors, or against one or more of joint or of joint
or several obligors, shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a party
to the proceeding wherein the judgment was rendered.
History:
L. 1929, ch. 61, § 2; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 47-0-2.

Uranium
Investment
Corp. v. Sugar
Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 326 P. 2d 1022.

In general.
Cited in United States v. First Security
Bank, 208 F. 2d 424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d
951.

3.

1.

2.

Release of claim.
In an action to recover attorney's
fees
and costs for services rendered in effecting
an incorporation
where both the corporation and incorporators
were obligated to
attorney for different amounts, the obligation of the incorporators could be released
only if the corporation
paid the full
amount of attorney's reduced claim against
the corporation and could not be released
merely by attorney's taking judgment for
the amount of his reduced claim. Plateau

&

Joint tort-feasors.
A judgment in favor of one joint tortfeasor is no bar to an action against another tort-feasor.
Bergeson v. Life Ins.
Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150.

Collateral References.
J udgmen t~632.
50 C.J.S. Judgment § 756.
Amount of recovery
in tort action
against servant or other person who was
the active tort-feasor
as limit of amount
recoverable
against one responsible only
derivatively,
141 A. L. R. 1168.
Creditor's reservation
of rights against
surety in releasing or extending time to
principal debtor, 139 A. L. R. 85.
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Right
of tort-feasor
to contribution
where judgment creditor is spouse, parent,
child, etc., of other tort-feasor
against

whom contribution
2d 1003.

is sought,

19 A. L. R.

15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor.-The amount or value of any consideration received by the obligee from one or more of several obligors, or from
one or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, in whole or in partial
satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to the extent of the
amount received on the obligation of all co-obligors to whom the obligor
or obligors giving the consideration did not stand in the relation of a
surety.
History:
L. 1929, ch. 61, § 3; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 47-0-3.
In general.
Cited in United States v. First Security
Bank, 208 F. 2d 424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d
951; Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 4 U. (2d)
155, 289 P. 2d 1045, 1049.

1.

2. Construction in general.
This section presupposes that there are
rights which can be reserved.
Dawson v.
Board of Education
of Weber County
School Dist., 118 U. 452, 222 P. 2d 590.
3. Release of joint obligor.
In personal injury action, where plaintiff accepted a substantial
sum from defendant in consideration
of promise not
to sue defendant for injuries sustained in
accident, and thereafter
dismissed his suit
against defendant,
trial court properly
deducted such sum from judgment
rendered against remaining
codefendants.
Green v. Lang Co., Inc., 115 U. 528, 206 P.
2d 626.
4. Effect of release of one joint debtor.
This statute permits plaintiff who has
not been fully compensated to release one
of several defendants
without
releasing
others by expressly and in writing reserving his rights against such others, with incidental provision that payments received
from released one shall be credited
to
others, unless there exists between obligors some relationship
which would make
such credit inequitable.
Greenhalch
v.
Shell Oil Co., 78 F. 2d 942.
Where plaintiff
released defendant
in

personal
injury
suit reserving
only his
right against physician for careless treatment, held such release discharged another
defendant whose connection with the prem-·
ises, the defective condition of which resulted in injury, was unknown to plaintiff
at time release was drawn.
Greenhalch v.
Shell Oil Co., 78 F. 2d 942.
Generally discharge of one joint debtor
discharges his co-joint debtor; as, for example, where there is a payment or accord
and satisfaction.
Rocky Mountain
Stud
Farm Co. v. Lunt, 46 U. 299, 316, 151 P.
521.

Full a.mount accepted.
This section was not applicable, where
plaintiff's acceptance of full amount which
he could have recovered from joint tortfea.sors, had they both been liable, extinguished his cause of action.
Dawson v.
Board of Education
of Weber County
School Dist., 118 U. 452, 222 P. 2d 590.
5.

6.

Covenant not to sue.
A covenant not to sue one joint and
several obligor does not release the remaining obligors.
Bergeson v. Life Ins.
Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150.
7.

Satisfaction
of judgment.
Satisfaction
of judgment against one of
two or more joint and several obligors will
bar an action against the remaining obligors. Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150.

Collateral References.
Paymente=:>51.
70 C.J.S. Payment § 40.

15-4-4. Release of co-obligor-Reservation
of rights.-Subject
to the
prov1S1ons of section 15-4-3, the obligee's release or discharge of one or
more of several obligors, or of one or more of joint or of joint and several
obligors, shall not discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee in
writing and as part of the same transaction as the release or discharge expressly reserves his rights; and in the absence of such a reservation of
rights shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in section
15-4-5.
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L. 1929, ch. 61, § 4; R. S. 1933

& C. 1943, 47-0-4.

Compiler's Note.
The references in this section to "section
15-4-3" and "section 15-4-5" appeared in
Code 1943 as "section 47-0-3" and "section
47-0-5" respectively.
In general.
Applied in Plateau Uranium Investment
Corp. v. Sugar & Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 326
P. 2d 1022.
1.

2. Covenant not to sue.
Under a settlement
between plaintiff
and defendant, a mail carrier, in which
plaintiff did not give an outright release
from liability to the defendant, but executed a covenant not to sue, wherein the
right to proceed against the United States
under the Tort Claims Act was specifically
reserved, the settlement
did not bar recovery against the United States.
United
States v. First Security Bank, 208 F. 2d
424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d 951.
3. Effect of release in Federal Tort Claims
case.
The release of an airlines by the widow

of a passenger who was killed in a collision
operated to release the United States from
claim based on the negligence of its employees in giving directions and failing to
warn airliners.
Matland v. United States,
285 F. 2d 752.
Collateral References.
Release€=>29 (2).
76 C.J.S. Release § 48.
Agreement with one tort-feasor that any
judgment that may be recovered will not
be enforced against him, as affecting liability of co-tort-feasor, 160 A. L. R. 870.
Creditor's reservation
of rights against
surety in releasing or extending time to
principal debtor, 139 A. L. R. 85.
Discharge or settlement by, or payment
to, one partner, or co-obligee, as affecting
rights of others, 142 A. L. R. 371.
Release of one responsible for injury as
affecting liability of physician or surgeon
for negligent treatment
of injury, 40 A.
L. R. 2d 1075.
Release of, or covenant not to sue, one
primarily liable for tort but expressly reserving rights
against
one secondarily
liable, as bar to recovery against latter,
20 A. L. R. 2d 1044.

15-4-5. Release of co-obligor-Effect of knowledge of obligee.-If an
obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express reservation of
rights against a co-obligor then knows or has reason to know that the
obligor released or discharged did not pay as much of the claim as he
was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the
obligee's claim against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount
which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the released or discharged obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay.
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not then such
knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: ( a)
the amount of the fractional share of the obligor released or discharged,
or (b) the amount that such obligor was bound by his contract or relation
with the co-obligor to pay.
History:

L. 1929, ch. 61, § 5; R. S. 1933

& C. 1943, 47-0-5.

1.

In general.
Applied in Plateau

Uranium

Corp. v. Sugar & Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 326
P. 2d 1022.
Collateral References.
Release€=>29(2).
76 C.J.S. Release § 48.

Investment

15-4-6. Death of joint obligor-Survivorship.-On
the death of a joint
obligor in contract his executor or administrator shall be bound as such
jointly and severally with the surviving obligor or obligors.
History:
L. 1929, ch. 61, § 6; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 47-0-6.

Collateral References.
Contracts(s::;;>182(2).
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 353.
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15-4-7. Effective date of chapter.-This
gations arising prior to July 1, 1929.
History:
L. 1929, ch. 61, § 7; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 47-0-7.

15-4-7

chapter shall not apply to obli-

Compiler's Note.
The reference in this section to "this
chapter"
appeared
in the Code 1943 as
"this title."
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